The paper develops and empirically tests a theoretical framework to evaluate the impact of national institutional frameworks on the organization and innovation strategy of entrepreneurial technology firms. European economies can perform well in emerging technology industries such as biotechnology and software. These economies do so, however, not by radically altering institutional frameworks to mimic the US liberal economy model, but by seeking out subsegments within these industries in which firms can embrace long-standing comparative institutional advantage. While the UK and, to a limited extent, Sweden, have developed institutions similar to those found in the US that help govern "radically innovative" firm competencies, Germany has invested in institutional frameworks associated with "competency enhancing" human resource practices that give its firms an advantage in more generic technologies in which organizational complexity is higher.
INTRODUCTION
Recent studies of sectoral specialisation and technological development across market economies have shown how contrasting patterns of technical change can be explained by the different institutional frameworks that have become established in distinct types of economy (see, e.g., Casper, 2000; Casper et al., 1999; Soskice, 1997; . According to the "varieties of capitalism" framework, "liberal market economies" (LMEs) such as the US and the UK excel in developing the necessary competencies to innovate in industries dominated by rapidly emerging technologies. More organised or "coordinated market economies" (CMEs) like Germany, by contrast, have developed institutions that advantage long-term and incremental innovation strategies, but inhibit more radical innovation paths (Hall and Soskice, 2001; compare Nooteboom, 2000; Whitley, 2000; . A key assertion of this view is that national patterns of specialisation are created by comparative institutional advantages in governing the organizational competences needed to innovate within particular technological fields.
Such contrasts help to identify core differences between advanced industrial economies, but tend to underestimate the adaptiveness of firms within an economy and important differences between sub-sectors. These help to explain a number of features of some European economies in the 1990s that appear anomalous from a simple interpretation of the varieties of capitalism approach. For example, while the dichotomy of exit and voice forms of capitalism suggests that there should be virtually no entrepreneurial technology firms within "coordinated market economies" such as Germany or Sweden, and the liberal market economies like the UK should have a comparative institutional advantage in producing radically innovative technology firms, entrepreneurial technology firms appear to be thriving in many areas of Continental Europe, and the performance of UK firms has been relatively poor in some sub-sectors of the biotechnology and software industries.
In order to explain such phenomena and identify how institutional frameworks generate distinctive strategies and organisational capabilities in more detail, we need to link institutional arrangements to the ways that companies develop different kinds of technologies in emerging industries at the subsectoral level. In this paper we consider the various sorts of problems that firms have to manage in developing new technologies in different sub-sectors of the biotechnology and software industries, and how particular institutional frameworks in Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom affect their strategies. We suggest that the core issues faced by entrepreneurial technology firms -developing skills, managing hiring and sometimes firing personnel, and coordinating technology development with external actors -are strongly influenced by the skill formation and labour market institutions within these economies.
While liberal market economies such as the US or UK do have institutional arrangements that are conducive to the development of project-based entrepreneurial technology start-ups focusing on discontinuous radical innovations, there are other subsectors of emerging industries where more complex and stable organisations are effective. Success in such segments is strongly advantaged by institutional structures that create competence enhancing human resource structures. Coordinated market economies such as Germany and Sweden have superior institutional frameworks to govern these kinds of such collaborative enterprises and have emerged as leaders within Europe in developing them. However, in the case of the development of middleware software in Sweden, a sub-sector in which external coordination across firms is important, the activities of large firms appear to have altered "normal" institutional incentives.
As a result, large numbers of software firms with high levels of technical intensity have become established there.
We discuss this case in some detail in the last section of this paper. The first section focuses on two key issues faced by entrepreneurial technology firms in different subsectors of the computer software and biotechnology industries, while the second suggests how these are connected to varied institutional arrangements. The third section provides evidence on patterns of specialisation across different sub-sectors of the software and biotechnology industries within Germany, Sweden, and the UK, while the fourth considers the German case in more detail.
Finally, we examine the development of middleware software firms in Sweden.
KEY MANAGEMENT ISSUES FACING ENTREPRENEURIAL TECHNOLOGY FIRMS
In seeking to explain variations in patterns of development of entrepreneurial technology companies in different subsectors, it is useful to distinguish two kinds of technological risks that affect managerial priorities (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1993; Breschi and Malerba, 1997; Dosi, 1988) . First, appropriability risks reflect the ease with which competitors can imitate innovations. They are typically managed through patent and copyright protection or through controlling complementary assets, as discussed by Teece (1986) . In the pharmaceutical industry, for example, patent protection is relatively effective because minor changes in the structure of therapeutic drugs can have major consequences for their operation in the human body (Gambardella, 1995) . As a result, drug discovery firms are able to specialise in highly risky activities without needing to develop complementary assets to protect their innovations.
Second, competence destruction risks reflect the volatility and uncertainty of technical development that vary greatly between technologies, both in terms of the technological trajectories being followed and market acceptance. Where technological uncertainty is high, it is difficult to predict which investments and skills will be effective and firms have to be able to change direction at short notice. Consequently, the managers of radically innovative firms are faced with the need to attract and motivate expert staff to work on complex problems when unpredictable outcomes may involve dismissal and/or organizational failure.
To offset high technical or market uncertainty, most firms competing to create radical innovations in markets where winners of innovation races can expect to capture a relatively large share of emerging markets focus on technology areas in which appropriability regimes through copyright and patent protection are quite strong. When appropriability risks are relatively low because standard forms of intellectual property protection are sufficient to guard technical innovations from being copied, management can focus primarily on R&D activities. This minimises organizational complexity, allowing a relatively coherent focus on core milestones needed to develop a new product or technology. Such radically innovative firms are typically project-based organizations. Managers here organise highly skilled staff into a series of teams focused on solving complex problems under very tight time constraints. They often employ performance based incentive schemes and employee ownership plans to induce employees to commit to solve organisational problems in these intense work environments. The prospect of large financial rewards encourages the alignment of the private incentives of highly skilled employees with those of commercial managers/owners. Considering first the key issues faced by innovative firms in subsectors that combine high levels of technical uncertainty with low appropriability risks, managers here need to be able to change research and development competences quickly. To do this, they need access to a pool of scientists, technicians, and other specialists with known reputations in particular areas that can quickly be recruited to work on projects (see Bahami and Evans, 1995) . If there is a cultural stigma attached to failing or changing jobs regularly, then engineers and managers may choose not to join firms with high-risk research projects, for fear that if the project fails the value of his or her engineering and/or management experiences could significantly decline. Furthermore, high levels of competence destruction create knowledge investment problems. Employees have an incentive not to invest in large amounts of firm-specific knowledge, such as proprietary software languages, when there is a strong probability that their employment tenure at the firm will be low (or that the firm could quickly fail).
These kinds of project-based firms (Whitley, 2002) are widespread in many sub-sectors of the biotechnology and computer software industries. One such sub-sector is standard (or application-based) software created for large homogenous markets where demand for customisation is low. Examples include graphic application software (e.g. CAD/CAM), multimedia and computer entertainment software, and a variety of application software used to run computer networks (e.g. e-mail, FTP, groupware, and document management programs).
Most companies developing such standard software are project-based firms with relatively simple organizational structures.
Low customisation and high scale economies here lead to intense competitive races to establish dominant designs and introduce new features (or "functionality") to software products through periodic upgrades. Such competition creates high competence destruction within the software industry and the failure of small development houses. Since it is relatively easy to protect standard software products through a combination of: a) patent/copyright protection, b)
secrecy over a program's so-called source-code, or c) "lock-in" effects once a product becomes successful and a customer base develops (see Shapiro and Varian, 1999) , these firms do not usually need to integrate R&D with other activities. Knowledge properties across standard software firms are relatively standardised or industry-specific. While software developers and engineers working within the firm often have advanced graduate training, their skill-sets are relatively generic across employers and customers, including industry-wide computer languages and analytical training.
Therapeutics based biotechnology is a second common example of a sub-sector populated by radically innovative technology start-ups. A defining feature of therapeutics research is its very high scientific intensity in the sense of being closely dependent upon new scientific knowledge of generic biological phenomena and processes. Firms often are constituted on the basis of theoretical expertise pertaining to particular biomedical research areas, and then develop or acquire any number of particular application technologies needed to pursue projects as research progresses. Uncertainty regarding the success of basic scientific research creates relatively high technological volatility for start-up therapeutic firms.
Ethnographic accounts consistently document the widely changing course of therapeutic firm research activities over time, which often leads to repeated changes in the competence structure of the firm (see, e.g., Werth, 1993 , Rabinow, 1996 . More generally, failure rates are high and time horizons are relatively long throughout the drug development process (Henderson et. al. 1999) . A recent study of research dynamics within the area of Alzheimer's disease, for example, noted over twenty discrete networks of firm/lab combinations conducting competitive research (Pennan, 1996) .
A final example of a radically innovative sub-sector is middleware software. Perrow, 1985; Kitschelt, 1991) . For middleware firms, low technological cumulativeness and the need for coordination across groups of firms in complementary markets create high standards related risks (Arthur, 1994) . To succeed firms must successfully coordinate technical specifications or designs with other firms in a technology area.
Turning now to consider firms operating in subsectors that combine lower levels of technological uncertainty with greater appropriability risks, they are likely to attempt to integrate new technologies with other assets that generate firm-specific advantages (Teece, 1986 More complex relationships between employers and employees exist when firms develop distinctive competences through the integration and enhancement of varied knowledge and skills.
Employment relationships are here often characterised by incomplete, long-term employment contracts due to the existence of considerable tacit and often firm-specific knowledge developed across functional teams within the firm (see generally Miller, 1992) . Though generic industry skills may be used to create and update these technologies, some skills or routines become specific to the firm (Winter, 1987) . Proprietary and team-based work organization is here likely to lead to the creation of firm specific skills.
Such firm-specific knowledge is valuable to the firm, but hard to sell on open labour markets or markets for technology. Firm-specific knowledge investments, once made, could lead to opportunistic demands by employers. Employees might hesitate making such knowledge investments without a credible commitment from management that they will not be exploited.
Moreover, tacit knowledge can easily lead to information asymmetries between the management and employees of a firm, creating potential difficulties for management to monitor and appropriately reward work, particularly across members of project teams.
As a result, the management of skilled staff in such situations involves quite different issues from those faced by project-based firms. When organizational complexity is high, managers need to encourage employees to collaborate in developing organisation-specific capabilities, often through long-term employment and generally consultative work place arrangements, in order to exploit tacit knowledge within the firm. They are compelled to create "credible commitments" not to act opportunistically after sunk-cost skill investments have been made (Miller, 1992) . Once such commitments become credible, for example through the creation of reputations for being stable employers or the creation of "constitutional" limits on the management of the firm, risky employment contracts can become viable. While the development of corporate cultures is crucial to the success of particular firms, firm-specific commitment strategies have a relatively long time-horizon that could prove difficult for entrepreneurial technology firms to implement effectively, especially during the start-up phase.
These kinds of competence enhancing human resource policies are far more feasible when clusters of firms within a shared technology and labour market develop complementary patterns of human resource development. If cultural norms within a local labour market or, more likely, institutional structures such as legal constraints on hiring and firing, exist, then the expectations of scientists, engineers, and technicians will be towards long-term employment and generally consultative workplaces, leading to the rapid formation of complex organizational structures and associated knowledge investment patterns within groups of entrepreneurial startups. As in the case of competence destroying technologies, for these human resource strategies to be viable most firms within a local labour market must adopt similar strategies. If employee poaching, for example, is an accepted and common practice within a community of firms, then employees will naturally gravitate towards skill development strategies centred on generic and codified skills that are easily saleable on such labour markets.
Entrepreneurial firms in two sub-sectors of the software and biotechnology industries, enterprise software and platform biotechnologies, exemplify this constellation of organizational competences. In contrast to standard software, enterprise software consists of software platforms or modules that are extensively customised for individual clients. Firms in this category include those developing enterprise resource planning (ERP), customer relationship management (CRM), groupware and systems integration products as well as a number of firms creating sector-specific enterprise tools (e.g. logistics and supply chain management tools).
Companies developing platform biotechnologies share a similar pattern of business organization. They create enabling technologies that are sold to other research labs. Products include consumable kits used to rationalise common molecular biology lab processes, such as the purification of DNA and other important molecules. Platform technology firms have also developed a number of engineering and information technology based applications that have been used to automate many aspects of the discovery process within therapeutics. Examples include high throughput "combinatorial chemistry" applications to aid the screening of potential therapeutic compounds and the development of genetic sequencing and modelling techniques.
Firms in both enterprise software and platform technology share similar patterns of industrial organization. Technologies in each segment tend to be generic with high appropriability risks. As a result, entry is relatively easy, and dozens of firms exist in most enterprise software and platform biotechnology segments. Highly competitive enterprise software markets include enterprise resource planning and, more recently, Internet software to run e-commerce. Numerous firms also compete in most platform technology markets, such as nucleic acid filtration or amplification (PCR) or information technology rich areas such as DNA sequencing and bioinformatics. Within these markets, companies generally create complementary organizational capabilities that can be protected by the firm. These include assets needed to customise general technology platforms for specialised product niches. Doing so creates larger, more complex organizational structures than those seen at entrepreneurial technology firms focused more on the management of competence destruction risks.
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS AND COMPETENCY DEVELOPMENT
The ways that managers deal with these problems in entrepreneurial technology firms vary between market economies with different institutional frameworks (Whitley, 2000; .
The preceding analysis suggests that project-based entrepreneurial technology firms faced with high competence destruction risks develop quite different managerial practices to those adopted by more collaborative firms attempting to govern complex organizational structures. These latter companies encourage competence-enhancing patterns of work organization, while "hire and fire" is a virtual prerequisite for firms facing competence destruction. These different kinds of practices are greatly influenced by the skill formation and labour market institutions of different countries, in addition to their financial and political systems, as can be illustrated by contrasting coordinated and liberal market economies (Hall and Soskice, 2001; compare Whitley, 1999) .
Coordinated market economies typically display quite high levels of non-market coordination through credit-based finance, strong business associations and state supported technical standards setting and technical development. Some have formally regulated labour markets with legally-binding wage bargaining between unions and industry associations for most skilled workers, organised apprenticeship based systems of technical training, and regulative patterns of company and corporate law that grant unions a strong say in corporate governance.
Institutional frameworks within CMEs strongly favour the development of managerial commitments needed for employees to willingly make firm-specific knowledge investments that are not easily saleable on open labour markets. Such arrangements tend to "lock-in" owners, managers, and skilled employees into long-term, organised relationships. Strong norms and legal obstacles to "hire and fire" combined with a long-standing tradition, buffered by codetermination laws, of consultative patterns of work organization, favour competence enhancing human resource policies. As Streeck (1984) has argued with respect to Germany, within CMEs management must treat employees as "fixed" rather than "variable costs", and as a result have a strong interest in developing long-term career structures for all skilled employees. Companies embracing this system face far less institutionalised "lock-in" regarding employees or other stakeholders to the company. Hire-and-fire, when embraced by most companies within a sector, can be used to create large external labour markets for most skills. On the other hand, employees facing this pattern of labour market organization will be extremely reluctant to develop patterns of firm-specific skill development needed to support entrepreneurial strategies relying on the development of high organizational complexity. This discussion suggests that LMEs have a comparative institutional advantage in creating clusters of radically innovative project-based firms, but, on the other hand, have a comparative institutional disadvantage in the governance of entrepreneurial firms where organizational complexity is high.
In the light of this analysis we now examine the performance of three European economies in three radically innovative sub-sectors (standard software, therapeutics biotechnology, middleware software) and two organisationally complex subsectors (enterprise software, and platform biotechnologies). Two economies are governed by institutions that encourage high levels of economic coordination, Germany and Sweden, while the third, the United Kingdom, most resembles the liberal market economy.
Germany and Sweden are paradigmatic examples of coordinated political economies (see Thelen, 1993; Katzenstein, 1989; Pontusson and Swenson, 1996) . Within both countries nonmarket forms of business coordination are facilitated by the embeddedness of large firms within networks of powerful trade and industry associations, as well as a similar, often legally mandated, organization of labour and other interest organizations within para-public institutions (Katzenstein, 1989) . Businesses and other social actors engage in these associations to create important non-market collective goods, such as the apprenticeship system or network of collaborative technology transfer institutes.
Public policy in both countries focuses on neo-corporatist bargaining environments through the legal delegation of specific bargaining rights to unions and other stakeholders within firms (see Streeck, 1984) . Strong codetermination laws empower unions and other stakeholders to bargain the terms of industrial change with employer associations. Industrial relations in both countries lock managers and employees into long-term relationships, promoting competence enhancing human resource development within firms. These institutions should advantage the governance of organisationally complex collaborative firms.
In strong contrast, the UK has developed largely LME institutions (see Hall and Soskice, 2001; Wood 2001; King and Wood, 1999) . The financial system is strongly capital market based, with total market capitalization as a percentage of GDP at the end of 1997 at 151%
exceeding the United States (121%) and far ahead of Germany's still predominately bank-centred system (26%) (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1998) . Financial and labour markets are largely deregulated, facilitating "hire and fire", while corporate law is primarily enabling in nature and focused on shareholder primacy (see Monks and Minow, 1995) . Particularly through the 1980s and 90s, the UK dramatically deregulated markets and weakened the power of collective actors within society, above all unions. This liberal market orientation should encourage the development of radically innovative project-based firms.
Given our characterisation of the five technologically dynamic subsectors we would expect the success of project-based and collaborative entrepreneurial technology firms in each to vary considerably between in Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. In particular, while the first two countries should evince greater success in platform biotechnology and enterprise software, they are likely to be less successful in the other three subsectors. These expectations are summarised in table 1.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE UK SUB-SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY AND SOFTWARE COMPANIES IN GERMANY, SWEDEN, AND THE UK
To assess the validity of these expectations we examined the distribution of publicly quoted companies in the biotechnology and software industries in these three countries in terms of their preponderance in subsectors with different kinds of technological risks. While the subsectoral specialisation of these firms does not necessarily reflect only national economic performance in new industries, they performed well enough during their initial start-up phase for investment banks and private investors to invest in their further growth through initial public offerings on the stock market. If a country has a high number of public firms specialised in a particular sub-sector this is a good indicator that competences associated with that sub-sector can be efficiently governed within the country's institutional frameworks.
The primary business of each company was classified through an analysis of their web pages. We also drew upon company summaries and sub-sector classifications published on the Internet by financial service companies to verify our classifications. All biotechnology and software firms listed on technology-oriented stock markets in the UK, Germany, and Sweden were included. As our theoretical analysis rests largely on nation-specific institutional effects on the organization of firms, we checked to ensure that all companies included in our analysis had corporate headquarters in Germany, Sweden, or the UK. This led to the removal of three companies listed on the German Neuer Markt that had headquarters outside Germany.
For many biotechnology companies determining whether the primary orientation was towards development of platform technology or therapeutic products was simple. Therapeutic companies presented themselves as specialists within particular therapeutic areas, such as immunology or cardiovascular diseases, and had extensive internal expertise in disease-specific areas. Platform technology companies focused extensively on their technological competencies that are usually presented as applicable across a wide array of therapeutic research areas.
However, some companies, particularly in the genomics area, develop technology platforms that can then be used to generate therapeutic targets (so-called "gene to lead" strategies). For these companies, we examined whether the primary technological orientation was towards the improvement of a general purpose technological platform and its licensing to other firms, or towards in-house therapeutic development.
Classifying the software firms was in most cases straightforward. Middleware software firms usually identified themselves by this product category, and were focused on the development of software to improve to aid the efficiency by which different computing systems interfaced within communications networks. To differentiate standard and enterprise software vendors we focused first on well known standard and enterprise software categories (e.g.
enterprise resource planning (ERP) and customer relationship management (CRM) products are well-known enterprise software segments, while multi-media, entertainment, and graphics software are well-known standard software segments).
For all other firms, we examined the degree by which the company offers to customise its software for clients. Companies offering extensive consulting, implementation, or systems integration services were classified as enterprise software firms. Standard software companies, on the other hand, generally licensed software "as is" to clients and do not engage in extensive consultancy-related services. These classifications were, when possible, verified by gathering data on the percentage of a company's earnings generated through software licensing, which is high for most standard software companies and low for enterprise software vendors (available for about half the firms in our database).
While for most cases sub-sectoral classification was not difficult, the problem with investigator bias remains inherent in this type of analysis. Future research could reduce it through identifying structural characteristics of firms within particular sub-sectors that could be captured through more quantitative data (see Casper and Vitols, 2002) . As our purpose within the present analysis is to capture broad trends at a macro-level, the more puzzling or interesting of which can then be explored in more detail, we believe simple investigator-led classifications are sufficient. Furthermore, adopting a multiple-methodology approach should help minimise the bias and classification error issues; supplementary data will be used to verify these macroresults for some cases.
Considering first the distribution of biotechnology firms in Germany, Sweden and the UK, summarised in table 2, we can see that the United Kingdom is the only one of these three countries with a well-developed concentration of therapeutics biotechnology firms (34). These data support a number of consulting reports and previous academic studies concluding that the UK has Europe's strongest biotechnology sector (see e.g. Senker, 1996; Ernst and Young, 1999; Cooke, 1999; Casper and Kettler, 2001) .
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
Neither the German nor Swedish sectors have a critical mass of therapeutics biotechnology firms (only three in each country), while each has a larger number of platform biotechnology firms. While supporting our expectations, these results could not be considered conclusive due to the small number of public biotechnology firms existing in Sweden and Germany. We therefore discuss the German biotechnology case in more detail below, drawing on a range of supplementary statistics that strongly suggest that firms in this country have a comparative institutional advantage in platform biotechnologies.
Turning to the software cases summarised in table 3, the German evidence strongly supports our predictions. While a relatively large number of German software firms are traded on the German stock market for growth companies, ninety percent of firms (54 in total) are in enterprise software, while there are only three firms in either standard software or middleware.
The UK data are also supportive. The UK has the largest software industry in Europe and 74 percent of these firms are in "radically innovative" segments, standard software or middleware.
This combined with the smaller number of enterprise software firms generally supports our predictions. However, the UK case is puzzling in another respect. Why are most of the UK software firms in standard software, with so few in middleware software?
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
The pattern of Swedish software firm specialisation, on the other hand, is problematic.
While a large number of enterprise software firms exist (20, or 44% of the total), over half the Swedish software firms are in radically innovative areas, and Sweden has Europe's largest concentration of publicly listed middleware firms. As we will discuss in more detail below, the 10 publicly listed middleware firms represent only a small percentage of a much larger population of recent start-ups in this area. The Swedish concentration of middleware software firms poses a strong challenge to the theoretical predictions of this paper; "coordinated market economies" should not have a comparative institutional advantage in this area.
Overall, these statistical data, despite limitations, provide good support for our theoretical analysis. Of the 15 cases, 12 could be interpreted as confirming our expectations (UK middleware, Swedish middleware and standard software being problematic). For these three European economies, the claim that national institutional frameworks influence patterns of competitive advantage, and specialisation, should be taken seriously. To further strengthen our analysis and also investigate the problematic middleware software case, the remainder of the paper examines a smaller number of cases in more detail. Process tracing based on field research, supplemented at times by additional descriptive statistics, can help to examine the link between institutions and firm organizational strategy more sharply.
We focus on two areas. Firstly, we examine recent developments in Germany where the state has, over the last decade, developed an array of technology policies designed to spur German industry into the types of entrepreneurial technology start-ups discussed here. These policies, while generally successful in promoting entrepreneurial start-ups, have convinced few firms to head into "radically innovative" market segments characterised by project-based firms.
We examine this case in more detail, providing richer evidence that German entrepreneurial technology firms are almost exclusively clustered in subsectors characterised by collaborative firms, despite substantial government subsidisation of high-risk venture financing.
Secondly, we examine the middleware software case in more detail, focusing on the Swedish case but with comparisons to Germany and the UK. The technological characteristics of middleware software are more complex than standard software due to the importance of technical standard coordination across firms. The activities of large firms capable of developing useful technical standards for firms active in the sector are crucial in this case and help to explain how Swedish firms have become more successful in the middleware software sector than UK ones. We use this case to examine the process by which radically innovative technology startups have become sustainable within a coordinated market economy.
GERMANY'S ENGAGEMENT WITH THE "NEW ECONOMY"
Beginning in the mid 1990s The German government introduced a range of new technology policies designed to create clusters of entrepreneurial start-up firms. Starting in 1996 the government decided to provide "public venture capital" in the form of "sleeping" or silent equity partnerships from federal sources (see Adelberger 2000) . Over the past five years well over one billion DM has been channelled into such investments, with over half of the new firms specialising in information technology, communications, or biotechnology. German public officials have crafted a dense network of support policies for university-centred spin-offs. This includes funding the creation of several technology parks and incubator labs, hiring of consultants to persuade university professors or their students to commercialise their research findings and help them design viable business plans, subsidies to help defray the costs of patenting their intellectual property, and the provision of management consulting and partnering activities once new firms are founded. The programs have concentrated on biotechnology, but recently have been extended into other sectors including software (Lehrer, 2000) .
Government support has dramatically reduced the financial risk of founding an entrepreneurial technology firm in Germany. The "public venture capital" program has spurred a dramatic increase in private venture capital. Given the relative ease of obtaining VC finance and, particularly for biotechnology firms, fairly sophisticated infrastructure support within low-rent start-up incubators, it is it not surprising that hundreds of new start-up firms have been founded in Germany. However, the vast majority of these firms are specialised in platform biotechnologies. In an initial survey of over 300 German biotechnology firms conducted in 1998, managers were asked to list the areas of their research activities. Therapeutics came in fifth, ranked well below contract research and manufacturing, platform technologies, diagnostics, and "other services." (Schitag Ernst and Young, 1998: 17) . A more recent survey published in late 2001 examined the number of therapeutic products developed across European biotechnology companies. This survey found that the UK companies had 128 products in development, compared to only six for Germany (Ernst and Young, 2001 ).
An analysis of the technological intensity of German biotechnology patents strongly supports the notion that German firms have specialised in sub-sectors with high cumulativeness. 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Turning to the software industry, German companies are overwhelmingly specialised in enterprise software markets. Most German software firms were founded during the 1980s to help fuel the corporate enterprise software markets; the average age across the 60 public firms is 15.3 years. Examples of prominent segments include enterprise resource planning (4 of the publicly listed firms), customer relationship management (5 firms), systems integration (7 firms), and a variety of sector-specific enterprise tools in areas such as logistics and supply chain management (9 firms).
There is only one cluster of German publicly traded software firms that is relatively young -a group of 7 firms active in the e-commerce software field (average age 7.4 years as of May 2001; Casper, 2002) . This group of firms has received substantial private venture capital funding, facilitating much faster growth before initial public offerings. Rather than relying on "organic" driven growth based on earnings, they have had the opportunity to invest lavishly to create large organizational structures in an attempt to quickly grab substantial market shares. A closer examination of this sub-sector reveals complex organizational structures and relatively incremental innovation patterns characteristic for new technology enterprises in Germany.
E-commerce software is one of the only core Internet infrastructure areas in which
German firms have established substantial market share in non-German language markets.
While American firms dominate several segments, particularly in the provision of software for "business to business" transactions, German firms are internationally competitive in the provision of software to facilitate on-line retailing ("business to consumer" ecommerce) and are also strong in creating secure-transaction software for financial services (see Casper, 2002) .
Business concepts underlying e-commerce software resemble those pioneered by the German firm SAP to create the Enterprise Resource Planning market.. E-commerce software firms develop customisable software modules designed to help client firms organise e-commerce platforms. The business model involves the creation and updating of a kernel of e-commerce applications -inventory tracking, accounting, order completion, as well as the creation of visual web-interfaces used by customers -which are typically installed and extensively customised by the software provider or third party software consultancies.
While e-commerce software firms may compete to introduce software with enhanced functionality, especially in the "ease of use" area, the software itself is relatively generic. E-commerce software platforms are proprietary systems completely owned and maintained by the developer. Patenting over core e-commerce processes appears weak; dozens of e-commerce software firms exist, most of which offer relatively similar technologies. To reduce these appropriability concerns, firms invest in a core proprietary library of programs that are then customised for clients during extensive implementation programs. Doing so creates a lock-in effect for the software vendor, and can also help capture rents from periodic "up-grade" cycles as the software is improved.
Germany's e-commerce software specialists resemble most German firms in developing human resource policies that are broadly competence enhancing in nature. Firms usually organise a group of programmers with advanced degrees who update the core software platform, along with a much larger group of trained technicians and consultants involved in implementation and service issues. Proprietary programming environments tend to keep competence destruction low -new programmers may be added to accommodate inevitable "feature creep", but existing staff have high job security due to the need to periodically update the code. Relatively complex coordination across teams of programmers and technicians involved in customisation and implementation work is key to competitive success.
In summary, in both biotechnology and software small German growth companies have gravitated away from segments with radical innovation and related competence destroying risks.
The German pattern of sub-sector specialisation in the biotechnology and software sectors strongly suggests that, while changing, the German model has not converged to a "liberal market economy" system capable of supporting project-based entrepreneurial technology firms. To some commentators, particularly in the business and consulting community (see e.g. Ernst and Young, 2001) , this pattern of specialisation represents a failure of German technology policy to alter the structure of the economy radically.
Indeed, outside the financial area, there have been no major reforms to German labour or company laws. Rapid hiring and firing continues to be difficult in Germany. Long-term employment strategies by large firms limit the development of labour markets for high quality staff. While large German firms can sell entire subsidiaries or business units or send some lower-productivity older employees into early retirement, codetermination law makes it difficult for firms to lay-off individual employees or groups of employees as part of the "normal" course of business (see Becker et. al., 1999 for a discussion of Hoechst's difficulties in this area). Seen in terms of career structure, there is a high risk for senior managers and researchers in moving from an established large company or prestigious university professorship to a start-up firm.
This constraint-based argument ignores the fact that several of Germany's new economy firms have been successful, capturing international markets for important biotechnology platform technologies and specialised e-commerce and related enterprise software. Rather than viewing
German developments as a case of failed technology policy in the face of institutional constraints, we would argue that German firms have specialised in areas of the new economy in which they have a comparative institutional advantage.
If the long term development of platform biotechnology and enterprise software firms does create substantial amounts of risk created by a weak appropriability regime, high cumulativeness, and high knowledge complexity, then it is likely that German institutional environments could allow more efficient governance structures to cope with these problems within collaborative firm structures. German national institutional frameworks continue to encourage competence enhancing human resource development through restraints on hire and fire that facilitate long-term employment. Access to a superior institutional environment could lead to German firms eventually outperforming firms located within liberal market economies in areas where complex organizational structures are important.
SWEDEN'S SURPRISING PERFORMANCE IN MIDDLEWARE SOFTWARE
Stylised contrasts between CMEs and LMEs need to be further elaborated when considering sectors where different kinds of knowledge and specifications need to be coordinated in the development of new technological systems. Under some circumstances large firms can act as de facto coordinating agents in CMEs and encourage the development of radically innovative firms in societies that otherwise would not be expected to support them. We now turn to consider firm development in such a sector, middleware software production.
The technological characteristics of middleware software are more complex than standard software, due to the importance of technical standard coordination across firms. This depends upon the resolution of collective action dilemmas that are difficult for numerous small firms to resolve, particularly when distributive issues hinge on the particular constellation of technical knowledge chosen (Shapiro and Varian, 1999) . In addition to human resource policy risks created by high competence destruction, middleware software firms face an additional coordination risk created by uncertainty about which emerging standards in a firm's chosen technical field will succeed.
Though governments have at times played important roles within telecommunication standards (see Glimstedt, 2001) , within much of the middleware software sector most firms are dependent upon large corporations, typically telecommunication equipment manufacturers and established companies active in network intensive standard software products, for the provision of standards to help products become interoperable (see Casper and Glimstedt 2001 Glimstedt and Zander, 2002 ).
We will use this case to examine the interplay between human resource coordination and technology coordination. The key issue here is: what constellation of policies must the large firm take to induce engineers, managers, and financiers to make commitments to projects that are normally extremely risky within their societal contexts? Can dominant actors take actions to "tip" labour market institutions in a direction contrary to "normal" institutional incentives with an economy?
We focus here on two factors: a) the influence of technology standards in fostering a switch from firm specific to more generic, industry-specific technical skill-sets among software engineers, and b) initiatives taken by Ericsson to foster entrepreneurialism surrounding technologies it is sponsoring. From the perspective of human resource coordination, these factors have reduced the career risk of working in a radically innovative technology start-up, and through doing so allow competence destroying firm strategies to become sustainable. 
CONCLUSIONS
By focusing on the characteristics of different sub-sectors in this paper we have examined how institutional frameworks structure distinctive strategies and organisational capabilities of firms in a more precise manner than much institutional theory. Institutional explanations associated with the "varieties of capitalism" literature strongly predict that the diffusion of entrepreneurial patterns of organising technology firms should differ across European economies. Both descriptive statistics on sub-sector specialisation and more qualitative case analysis suggest that the concept of comparative institutional advantage helps to explain patterns by which new technologies are developing in Europe.
One contribution of this analysis is to demonstrate that European economies can perform well in emerging technology industries such as biotechnology and software. These economies do so, however, not by radically altering institutional frameworks to mimic the US liberal economy model, but by seeking sub-segments within these segments in which firms can embrace long-standing comparative institutional advantage. Evidence presented in this paper has documented the existence of important sub-sectors, such as high quality platform biotechnologies and enterprise software, in which patterns of company organization and related business strategy need to develop complex organizational structures focused on competence enhancing human resource management. Firms within coordinated market economies such as Germany or Sweden have specialised in these technologies not as a "second best" solution, but because the institutional organization of these business systems create institutional advantages in resolving the managerial dilemmas that characterise these sub-sectors.
An implication of this analysis is that trade-offs exist in designing policies intended to foster entrepreneurial technology firms. Because different types of technology firms differ in their core organization, their optimal governance requires their embeddedness in different innovation systems. While the US has a large lead in fostering new technology firms, as key technological drivers diffuse through the international economy, one can expect that a division of labour will emerge cross nationally. While institutions associated with the US (and UK) innovation systems support business models demanding extreme flexibility (and competence destruction), Germany, Sweden, and other "organised" economies might promote superior innovation dynamics in areas dominated more by business integration and appropriability risks.
The focus on sub-sectors also sheds light on the organization of more "radically innovative" technological segments such as therapeutics biotechnology, standard software, and middleware software. Our analysis complements a number of important studies of the institutional organization of high-technology regions such as Silicon Valley (Saxenian, 1994; Kenney, 2000; Almeida and Kogut, 1999) . We share with these studies the suggestion that low technological cumulativeness and resulting competence destruction across clusters of new technology start-ups can be facilitated by the creation of extremely fluid local labour markets.
While most studies of technology clusters have a regional focus, we focus primarily on broader national institutional frameworks that structure patterns of coordination across particular sectors and regions within the economy. Doing so helps explain broad differences in technological specialisation across economies, but cannot explain the relatively rare development of regional economies capable of fostering high levels of technological intensity across start-up firms within particular economies. In other words, there are more "degrees of freedom" between the orientation of national institutional frameworks and the ability of managers across groups of firms to develop innovative competencies than is suggested by varieties of capitalism theory.
Linking insights from varieties of capitalism research with the emerging literature on regional technology clusters is an important area for future research. 
